Verify TOTP quickstart Live

TOTP (time-based one-time password) verifies a code that the user's own authenticator app generates, rather than a code you send them. It is the standard for app-based two-factor authentication: no message is transmitted, so there is no carrier cost, no delivery delay, and no SMS-interception risk. TOTP is factor-based rather than send-based: instead of one start call and one check call, your app creates a durable factor, the user verifies it once by scanning a QR code, and every check after that runs against the same factor.

Setup time: 1 hour$0.03 per successful check

What TOTP is

With SMS, email, voice, and WhatsApp, Verify generates a code and delivers it to the user. TOTP inverts that: the code is produced on the user's device by an authenticator app (Google Authenticator, Authy, 1Password, and similar) from a shared secret and the current time, following RFC 6238. By default the code is 6 digits and rotates every 30 seconds, and your backend verifies whatever the user reads off their app. Nothing is sent over any network to the user, which is what makes TOTP immune to SMS pumping and interception.

When to choose TOTP

Choose TOTP for account security on accounts that already have a password, where you want a second factor that costs nothing to deliver and cannot be intercepted in transit. It is the natural fit for a security-settings "enable two-factor authentication" flow. It is not a fit for first-contact verification of a phone or email you do not yet control: for that, send a code with SMS or email.

Prerequisites

• A message.com workspace with Verify activated. See Get started with Verify.
• A Verify Service with totp in its enabledChannels.
• An API key with the verify scope (mk_live_...). See Authentication.
• An authenticator app on the user's device to scan the QR code with (Google Authenticator, Authy, 1Password, or any standard TOTP app).

Defaults and bounds

Every factor gets sane RFC 6238 defaults unless your app overrides them at creation. These are per-factor settings, not per-service: two factors on the same service can run different digit counts or periods.

Skew of 1 means the check accepts the current time step plus or minus one period, which absorbs ordinary clock drift between the user's device and the server without materially widening the guessable window.

Step 1: create a factor

Creating a factor mints a secret, encrypts it at rest, and returns the QR code your user scans. This is a reveal-once response: the raw secret and the otpauthUri it is embedded in appear on this call and never again on any other endpoint, including the list call. If you do not capture and display them now, the only recovery is deleting the factor and creating a new one.

curl -X POST https://api.message.com/v1/verify/totp/factors \
  -H 'Authorization: Bearer mk_live_...' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{
    "accountName": "[email protected]"
  }'

curl -X POST https://api.message.com/v1/verify/totp/factors ^
  -H "Authorization: Bearer mk_live_..." ^
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" ^
  -d "{\"accountName\": \"[email protected]\"}"

const res = await fetch('https://api.message.com/v1/verify/totp/factors', {
  method: 'POST',
  headers: {
    Authorization: 'Bearer mk_live_...',
    'Content-Type': 'application/json',
  },
  body: JSON.stringify({ accountName: '[email protected]' }),
});
const { factor, secret, otpauthUri, qrDataUrl } = await res.json();
// Show qrDataUrl to the user now. secret and otpauthUri never appear on
// any other response, ever: store factor.id, discard the rest.

res = requests.post(
    "https://api.message.com/v1/verify/totp/factors",
    headers={"Authorization": "Bearer mk_live_..."},
    json={"accountName": "[email protected]"},
)
body = res.json()
factor, secret, otpauth_uri, qr_data_url = (
    body["factor"], body["secret"], body["otpauthUri"], body["qrDataUrl"]
)
# Show qr_data_url to the user now. secret and otpauth_uri never appear on
# any other response, ever: store factor["id"], discard the rest.

{
  "factor": {
    "id": "8f2c6b7a-9e0d-4a1e-8f2c-6b7a9e0d5c3f",
    "workspaceId": "b4d81f0a-2c5e-4f7b-9a3d-1e6c8f0b2a4d",
    "serviceId": "1f6a2e4c-9d3b-4a1e-8f2c-6b7a9e0d5c3f",
    "accountName": "[email protected]",
    "digits": 6,
    "period": 30,
    "skew": 1,
    "status": "pending",
    "createdAt": "2026-08-02T18:04:11.000Z",
    "lastStep": null,
    "verifiedAt": null,
    "lastUsedAt": null
  },
  "secret": "JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXPJBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP",
  "otpauthUri": "otpauth://totp/Acme:[email protected]?secret=JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXPJBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP&issuer=Acme&algorithm=SHA1&digits=6&period=30",
  "qrDataUrl": "..."
}

Render qrDataUrl directly as an <img src>, it is a complete data URL. If your user is on the same device as the enrollment flow (no camera to scan with), show otpauthUri as a tappable link instead, most authenticator apps register as a handler for the otpauth:// scheme. The factor starts in pending status and cannot be checked yet.

Note the id shapes: factor.workspaceId and factor.serviceId in the response are internal row UUIDs, not the vs_... public id you pass in the request, and they are not accepted by other Verify endpoints. The only id you need from this response is factor.id: store it and use it for verify, check, and delete.

{
  "error": "service_not_found"
}

{
  "error": "validation_error",
  "details": {
    "digits": ["Number must be less than or equal to 8"]
  }
}

Step 2: verify the factor

After the user scans the QR code, have them type the current code their app shows back into your UI, then submit it here. The first correct code flips the factor from pending to active. This call is enrollment, not a billed check: it does not count against the $0.03 check fee and does not emit a verify.* event.

curl -X POST https://api.message.com/v1/verify/totp/factors/8f2c6b7a-9e0d-4a1e-8f2c-6b7a9e0d5c3f/verify \
  -H 'Authorization: Bearer mk_live_...' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{
    "code": "482913"
  }'

const res = await fetch(
  `https://api.message.com/v1/verify/totp/factors/${factor.id}/verify`,
  {
    method: 'POST',
    headers: {
      Authorization: 'Bearer mk_live_...',
      'Content-Type': 'application/json',
    },
    body: JSON.stringify({ code: userTypedCode }),
  },
);
const result = await res.json();
// success: { verified: true, status: 'active' }
// failure: 400 { error: 'bad_code' }

res = requests.post(
    f"https://api.message.com/v1/verify/totp/factors/{factor['id']}/verify",
    headers={"Authorization": "Bearer mk_live_..."},
    json={"code": user_typed_code},
)
result = res.json()
# success: {"verified": True, "status": "active"}
# failure: 400 {"error": "bad_code"}

{
  "verified": true,
  "status": "active"
}

{
  "error": "bad_code"
}

{
  "error": "already_active"
}

A 404 { error: "not_found" } means the factor id does not exist or belongs to a different workspace than the calling key.

Step 3: check codes

Once a factor is active, every login or sensitive action checks a fresh code against it. This is the endpoint that bills: $0.03 per successful check, the same rate as every other Verify channel, charged only on verified: true.

curl -X POST https://api.message.com/v1/verify/totp/check \
  -H 'Authorization: Bearer mk_live_...' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{
    "factorId": "8f2c6b7a-9e0d-4a1e-8f2c-6b7a9e0d5c3f",
    "code": "119287"
  }'

curl -X POST https://api.message.com/v1/verify/totp/check ^
  -H "Authorization: Bearer mk_live_..." ^
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" ^
  -d "{\"factorId\": \"8f2c6b7a-9e0d-4a1e-8f2c-6b7a9e0d5c3f\", \"code\": \"119287\"}"

const res = await fetch('https://api.message.com/v1/verify/totp/check', {
  method: 'POST',
  headers: {
    Authorization: 'Bearer mk_live_...',
    'Content-Type': 'application/json',
  },
  body: JSON.stringify({ factorId: factor.id, code: userTypedCode }),
});
const result = await res.json();
// success: { verified: true }
// failure: { verified: false, reason: 'bad_code' | 'not_active' | 'not_found' | 'too_many_attempts' }

res = requests.post(
    "https://api.message.com/v1/verify/totp/check",
    headers={"Authorization": "Bearer mk_live_..."},
    json={"factorId": factor["id"], "code": user_typed_code},
)
result = res.json()
# success: {"verified": True}
# failure: {"verified": False, "reason": "bad_code" | "not_active" | "not_found" | "too_many_attempts"}

{
  "verified": true
}

{
  "verified": false,
  "reason": "bad_code"
}

{
  "verified": false,
  "reason": "too_many_attempts"
}

Wrong guesses are capped: repeated failures on the same factor return 429 { verified: false, reason: "too_many_attempts" } and the secret is never even decrypted for that attempt. The cap is a rolling window on the factor, not a permanent lockout, so it clears with time rather than requiring the user to re-enroll.

List factors

Returns every factor in the workspace, scoped to whatever service filter you apply on your own side. The response never includes the encrypted secret or any form of the raw secret: this is the read surface for showing a user their enrolled devices, not a way to recover a lost QR code.

curl -X GET https://api.message.com/v1/verify/totp/factors \
  -H 'Authorization: Bearer mk_live_...'

{
  "factors": [
    {
      "id": "8f2c6b7a-9e0d-4a1e-8f2c-6b7a9e0d5c3f",
      "workspaceId": "b4d81f0a-2c5e-4f7b-9a3d-1e6c8f0b2a4d",
      "serviceId": "1f6a2e4c-9d3b-4a1e-8f2c-6b7a9e0d5c3f",
      "accountName": "[email protected]",
      "digits": 6,
      "period": 30,
      "skew": 1,
      "status": "active",
      "createdAt": "2026-08-02T18:04:11.000Z",
      "lastStep": 61234567,
      "verifiedAt": "2026-08-02T18:05:02.000Z",
      "lastUsedAt": "2026-08-02T19:41:18.000Z"
    }
  ]
}

Delete a factor

Permanently removes a factor. Use this when a user disables two-factor authentication, loses their device, or wants to re-enroll: there is no way to reactivate a deleted factor and no recovery endpoint for its secret, which is stored encrypted at rest and never returned again after the creation response.

curl -X DELETE https://api.message.com/v1/verify/totp/factors/8f2c6b7a-9e0d-4a1e-8f2c-6b7a9e0d5c3f \
  -H 'Authorization: Bearer mk_live_...'

{
  "deleted": true
}

{
  "error": "not_found"
}

Why the generic start call rejects TOTP

POST /v1/verify is the shared send rail for SMS, email, voice, WhatsApp, and push: it mints a code, dispatches it to a destination, and bills nothing until the matching check succeeds. TOTP has no destination and nothing to dispatch, so the platform rejects it at that call rather than pretending to send:

curl -X POST https://api.message.com/v1/verify \
  -H 'Authorization: Bearer mk_live_...' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{
    "to": "[email protected]",
    "channel": "totp"
  }'

{
  "error": "channel_not_sendable",
  "channel": "totp",
  "message": "totp is factor-based, not send-based: enroll and check codes via /api/v1/verify/totp/* instead of the send rail"
}

Every other typed error across every Verify endpoint, including this one, is documented in full on Verify API error codes.

Fraud interactions

TOTP has a different threat model from the delivered channels. Because no code is transmitted, SMS pumping, interception, and delivery-based abuse do not apply, and there is no country allowlist or per-destination send throttle for a channel that never sends. The controls that remain are on the check side:

• Attempt limiting. Repeated wrong codes on the same factor return too_many_attempts, bounding brute-force guessing of the digit window without permanently bricking the credential.
• Replay rejection. A code cannot be accepted twice, closing the short window where a leaked or observed code could otherwise be replayed before it rotates.
• Short time window. The default 30-second rotation of the code itself limits how long any single leaked code stays useful.

Attempt limits and the rest of the Verify fraud model are covered in depth in the Verify fraud guide.

Troubleshooting

Every reason above, with its exact firing condition, is on the Verify API error codes page.